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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
\V AYNE STERLING PEARSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs-

JOHN W. TURNER, 'VARDEN,
UTAH STATE PRISON,

Case No.
12749

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
The appellant, 'Vayne Sterling Pearson, appeals
from a decision of the Third Judicial District Court
denying his release f ram the Utah State Prison upon a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
On June 18, 1971, a hearing was set and heard on
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before the Honorable l\Iarcellus K. Snow in the Third Judicial District
Court, Salt Lake County, alleging that 'Vayne S.
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Pearson's commitment to the Utah State Prison was
invalid. After hearing the matter the petition was denied.
RELIE}' SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant, Wayne S. Pearson, seeks a reversal of
the judgment and order of the court below, or in the
alternative that his appeal be reinstated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 16, 1971, appellant was tried before
the District Court of the Third Judicial District, in and
for the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, with the
Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, sitting with a jury, for
crimes of Grand Larceny in violation of 76-38-4, rtah
Code Annotated, ( 1953) and Second Degree Burglary
in violation of 76-9-3, Utah Code Annotated, ( 1953)
as amended in 1969. The transcript of the trial was admitted as evidence in the habeas corpus hearing (Trial
Transcript referred to as 'T', Hearing Transcript referred to as 'H') as plaintiff's exhibit one. The petition
for ·writ of habeas corpus was heard before the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, a judge of the Third Judicial
District, in and for the County of Salt Lake, State of
Ptah, on the 18th day of June 1971 at 2:00 p.m.
At the habeas corpus hearing, appellant was called
in his own behalf and testified that after having been
convicted in the present case, the appellant had a discussion with his attorney,
alter Ellett, at which time

'i\T
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Mr. Ellett represented to appellate that he would fi1e
a notice of appeal. (H. 4) l\Ir. Ellett did not file the
appeal, however appellant timely filed the appropriate
papers personally, and subsequently received conformation. (H. 5) Appellant testified that sometime in December, to the best of his recollection, Mr. Ellett again
met with appellant and informed him that three or four
more charges were going to be filed against petitioner
and that if petitioner would dismiss his appeal all new
charges would be dismissed. (H. 7) Mr. Ellett also informed appellant that at a later time he could try to obtain release on a writ of habeas corpus. (H. 7) Mr.
Ellett returned in the first part of January and appellant signed papers dismissing his appeal. (H. 8) Appellant testified that he agreed to the dismissal because it
was his understanding that the other charges would be
dismissed and that he could effect his release upon a
writ of habeas corpus. ( H. 8) The other charges were
in fact dismissed. (H. 8}
At trial
Lewis Miltenberger was called by the
State and testified that on April 18, 1970, he was a next
door neighbor of the Jensen family (the alleged victims
in the present case), and that he left his home between
8 :00 and 8 :30 p.m. on that date and observed a red Avis
panel truck stop in front of the Jensen home. ( T. 21)
He further testified that he returned home about 15
to 20 minutes later, observed a red panel truck on the
.Jensen lawn with the ha.ck of the truck near the doorway (T. 22) and saw two men loading a large object
into the back of the truck. ( T. 22} He testified that

when his automobile lights were shown on the area, the
truck began moving away and the men ran behind it.
(T. 22) He did not obtain the license number, nor could
he describe or identify the men. (T. 22)
Richard Ronald Jensen testified that he was residing at 5202 East l\Ioor Road in Salt Lake City, and
that upon returning home on April 18, 1970, he discovered his sofa as well as other items were missing from
his home, (T. 7) and he identified the sofa that h1d
later been found in l\irs. Rogue's home as his own.
(T. 6)
Mr. Clyde Thomas Beard testified that he was employed by the Great Salt Lake Transportation Com- ,
pany and that on the 18th day of April, 1970 before
5 :30 p.m. he had rented a small Avis panel van to Loretta K. Bogue (T. 27) identified appellant's co-defendant (T. 28), and further testified that the business
records indicated that the truck was returned at nine
minutes to 11 :00 p.m. on the same date. (T. 29) He said
that Mrs. Bogue was accompanied by a small child.
(T. 32)
Mrs .•Joan S. Huston was sworn and testified that
she rented the home at 1248 North 1400 West to Mr.
and Mrs. Wayne Bogue on February 28, 1970, and
identified those persons as appellant and Mrs. Bogue.
(T. 40) She recalled that appellant paid the first
month's rent in cash (T. 40), that the home was occupied until the middle of June (T. 43), and that the
other payments were made by postal money orders and
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that she did not know who paid them. (T. 43) She also
testified that she observed appellant on the premises
only twice, once two days after the home was rented ( T. 40), once about one month later ( 2. 42), and
that she had been to the home at least six times later
without ever seeing appellant. (T. 44)
Denise
was called on behalf of the State
and testifie<l that she lived next door to Mrs. Bogue,
and that she had been a baby-sitter for l\Irs. Bogue
about ten times, that it was always at her request, and
that Mrs. Bogue usually paid her. (T. 35) Appellant
was present on five or six of those occastions, that usually he was dressed in a coat and wearing a tie and that
they apparently went out on a date, returning later in
the evening. ( T. 37) Miss Merrell also related that she
was at home most of the time after school playing in
the yard ( T. 38), and that she did not observe appellant
aronnd the house at any time. (T. 36) She further testified that she recognized his car, but seldom saw the car
at l\Irs. Bogue's home.
DetectiYe Neil C. Boswell was sworn and testified
that after obtaining information from neighbors and officials of A vis Rental ( T. 46), he obtained a search warrant, and proceeded to Mrs. Bogue's residence. (T. 47)
Detective Boswell found Mrs. Bogue at home "·ith her
children, found a sofa matching the description in the
warrant, arrested her, and arranged for the evidence to
be transported to the police department. ( T. 47) Mrs.
Rogue was permitted to make telephone calls at her
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neighbor's home ( T. 55), and l\irs. Bogue testified that
one of those calls was to the residence of l\Ir. Winger
and that she left a message for Mr. Pearson to come
immediately to her home. (T. 67) .Mr. Pearson arrived
shortly thereafter, and Detective Boswell informed Mr.
Pearson that he did not have a warrant but would seek
one. ( T. 51) Appellant was arrested the following day.
(T. 52)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT HE "\VAS
DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN THAT
THERE
AS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
TO JUSTIFY SUBMITTING HIS CASE TO
THE JURY AND THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EYIDRNCE TO SUPPORT A
VERDICT OF GUILTY.
Appellant urges that the Federal and Utah State
Case law support his contention that habeas corpus can
be used as an appropriate remedy in his particular case.
In Mathis 'l'. People of State of Colorado, 425 F. 2<l
1165 ( 1970), at page 1166, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recognized that habeas
corpus may he used as a remedy in certain instances:
The sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction is not subject to federal habeas review,
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citation, unless the conviction is "so totally
devoid of evidentiary support as to raise a due
process issue," Edmondson v. Warden, 335
F. 2d 608, 4 Cir. 335.

Edmondson, snpra, is an example of an instance of the

court reviewing the evidence presented at trial, however
in that particular case the court determined there was
sufficient evidence to support the conviction. The Ptah
Supreme Court has also recognized in many cases,
Brown v. Turner. 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 {1968);
Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121
( 1967) ; Johnson v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 439, 473 P.2d
901 {1970); Klotz v. Turner, 23 Utah 2d 303, 462 P.2d
705 {1969); Rees v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 349, 471 P.2d
168 ( 1970) ; Sinclair v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 126, 434
P.2d 305 ( 1967); Sullivan v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 85,
448 P.2d 907 ( 1968); Syddall v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d
263, 437 P.2d 194 {1968); that habeas corpus may be
used to review a conviction in certain instances. The
Bryant case, supra, is representative of the language of
those cases where the court said:
The writ is, as our rules describe it, an extraordinary writ, to be used to protect one who is
restrained of his liberty where there exists no
jurisdiction or authority, or where the requirements of the law have been so ignored or
distorted that the party is substantially and effectively denied what is included in the term
due process of law. or where some other such
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circumstances exist that it would be wholly
unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction.
Appellant contends that he was effectively and substantially nenied due process of law and further that it
would be wholly unconscionable for this court not to
re-examine his conviction since the trial was totally devoid of evidence to support that conviction.
Inasmuch as the State in this case offered no testimony directly connecting the petition with a felonious
taking or aspiration, the only basis upon which the conviction may be upheld in upon the theory that appellant
was in possession of recently stolen property and failed
to make a satisfactory explanation. That particular
theory is provided for statutorily at 76-38-1, Utah Code
Annotated, ( 1953), under the definition of the Offense
of Larceny as follows:
Larceny is the felonious stealing, taknig, carrying, leading or driving away the personal property of another. Possession of property
recentlv stolen, when the person in possession
fails to make a satisfactory explanation, shall
be deemed prima facia evidence of guilt.
However, it seems to be a well established doctrine that
possession under this section must be personal, conscious
and exclusive, and mere association with or constructive
possession of recently stolen, or mere presence of accused at the place where stolen proprty is found is not
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sufficient. State v. Einsey, 77 Utah 348, 295 P. 247;
State v. Butterfield, 70 U. 529, 261 P. 804; State v.
Dyett, 114 U. 379, 199 P.2d 155; State v. Brooks, 101
U. 584, 126 P.2d 1044; State v. Morris, 70 U. 570, 262
P. 107.
In State v. 1llorris. supra, the court reversed appellant's conviction for the reason that the evidence was
insufficient to take the case to the jury, where the defendant was the camp tender for the owner of the herd
in which stolen sheep were found, and there was no
direct evidence connecting the defendant with the
larceny. The court in holding that possession was not
exclusive and personal cited Underhill on Criminal Evidence ( 2dEd) at page 527 as follows:
. . . The possession of the stolen property is
personal and exclusive if it is exclusive as to
all persons not particips criminis. As to accomplices, the possession of one is the possession of all. A mere constructive possession is
not enough. The accused will not be presumed
to have stolen articles which he does not know
he possesses. If other persons have equal right
and facility of access with him to a room,
truck, or closet where stolen goods are discovered, possession, not being exclusive or personal, is of no value as evidence.
The court in State v. B'lltterfield, su,pra, at page 533,
held that the possessor must not only have possession
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but also must recognize some interest in the property
when it said:
. . . But the term "possession" as here used
means a conscious personal possession, amounting to an express or implied assertion of ownership, citation, and, unless this character of
possession is proved by direct evidence or in
inferrable from other proven facts and circumstances, the evidence relating to possession is
of little or no value.
Further this court has held in State v. Kinsey, supra,
that possession alone is not sufficient to sustain a conviction when it said at page 351 :
Possession of articles recently stolen, when
couples with circumstances of hiding or concealing them, or of disposing or attempting to
dispose of them, or of making false or unreasonable or unsatisfactory explanations, may
be sufficient to connect the possession with
the commission of the offense. But mere or
base possession when not coupled with other
culpatory or incriminating circumstances, does
not alone suffice to justify a conviction.
A ppeilant assert8 that the State has failt?d to smtain their burden of placing him in possession of the
stolen property, that possession being "persona], exclusive and with a distinct, implicit or express assertion of
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ownership" as required by the cited cases. The States
has presented evidence that )lr. Pearson and Loretta
Bogue entered into r. rental agreement with :Mrs . .Toan
Houston on the 28th day of February, 1970, (T. 40)
and the appellant was observed at the home on only one
occasion, approximately one month later, although l\Irs.
Houston had made several visits to the house. (T. 41)
It must be recalled that l\Ir. Jensen's
was not
taken until the 18th day of April, 1970 and that Detective Bos,vell arrived at the home and arrested Mrs. Bogue
on the 25th day of April, 1970. Miss l\Ierrell's testimony
is the only evidence that places appellant at the home
between the 18th and the 25th day of April and that
visit was apparently for the purpose of taking Mri>.
Bogue out for a date. The trial transcript is totally devoid of evidence that appellant had received mail at that
address, paid any of the bills for the maintenance of the
household, kept any personal effects or even spent one
night at that address. l\fiss l\Ierrell's testimony at best
established that appellant was an occasional social visitor,
whose car was known to Miss Merrell but which was
seldom observed there. Viewing the State's evidence
most favorable to its position, the most that may fairly
be said is that, due to appellant's name appearing upon
the rental agreement, he was in constructive possession
of the Jensen property. The case law of the State of
Utah is clear that this type of possession is not sufficient
to sustain a conviction.
The appellant further asserts that even if the court
were to find that he was in possession, the State has

12
failed to establish that appellant attempted to hide or
dispose of the Jensen property or that he made false or
unreasonable explanation as to how he obtained the property as required by Kinsey, snrpa. There is no evidence
that appellant attempted to hide or dispose of the property or even that he was aware it was stolen. Absent
some culpatory or incriminating circumstances, a conviction based upon mere possession cannot stand.
The appellant also contends that due to the insufficiency of the evidence relative to Burglary in the
Second Degree, the submitting of the case to the jury
and the subsequent verdict of guilty was a denial of
petitioner's constitutional right of due process of the
law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.
In addition to the argument above, appellant asserts
that, opposed to larceny, there exists no statutory presumption dealing with the being in possession of recently stolen property. In State v. Kirkman, 20 Utah 2d at
page 46, this court, after citing § 76-38-1, Utah Code
Annotated, ( 1953) , said:
This statute has nothing to do with burglary
and applies only to charges of stealing . . . .
In State v. Nichols, 106 Utah 104, the court after
pointing out that the defendant was -charged with the
offense of burglary and not larceny, reversed defendant's reconviction upon the basis that there was nm:
direct evidence connecting appellant with the burglary
and that possession alone was not sufficient. The court
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in that case cited People v. II art, 10 Utah 204, 37 P. 330
at page 113 as follows:
'Ve do not think there was sufficient evidence
before the jury to justify a conviction of larceny, had that offense been charged in the
indictment; and we are also of the opinion that
the naked possession of stolen property from
6 to 24 hours after the larceny or housebreaking, when unaccompanied with any other incriminating fact or circumstances tending in
some degree to connect the accused with the
commission of the offense charged, is not sufficient evidence, in itself, upon which to convict of housebreaking. The offense of housebreaking is ordinarily removed one degree further from the act of larceny, and the mere possession of stolen goods does not have the same
tendency to connect the accused with the burglary or housebreaking as it would with larceny.
[Citing cases.]
Appellant contends that since the State's evidence
alleges nothing more than possession the lower court's
judgment as to burglary must be reversed.
POINT II
APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT APPELLANT'S 'VITHDRAW AL AND SUB SEQUENT DISMISSAL OF HIS APPEAL
AS
INVOLUNTARY AND ACCOMPLISHED

''r

THROUGH FEAR, PRESSURE AND COERCION.
It is appellant's contention that had it not been for
the threats on the part of the State to file and prosecute
him on additional offenses if he did not dismiss his
appeal, he would not have taken that action. Appellant
had every intention of proceeding with the appeal until
that time as evidenced by the fact that when his attorney delayed in filing the appropriate papers, he undertook the responsibility himself. In the alternative to
granting relief under Point I of appellant's brief, appellant submits that because of the coercion exerted
against him by the State the dismissal of his appeal was
involuntary and appellant further submits that said appeal should be reinstated.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the appellant's conviction was in violation of due process requirements in that there was not
sufficient evidence to justify submitting either the
larceny or the burglary court to the jury since the eYidence was insufficient under the law. In addition appellant's appeal should be reinstated since the withdrawal
of said appeal was accomplished through coercion and
thus was involuntary.
Respectfully submitted,
F.JOHNHILL
Attorney for Appellant

